branko-serbia

The Impact of Syria’s Conflict on

NATO’s Security

by  Branko Lazic 

Two years after the beginning of the Syrian revolu-tion and its transformation into a civil war, there are no signs that officials in Damascus are going to reach any kind of compromise with rebel leaders to end the violence. The negative implications of the conflict for Middle Eastern and global security have the potential to cause serious instability within the North Atlantic Community. Turkey, a NATO member state, borders Syria to the north. Therefore, the Syrian war poses a direct threat to NATO as a whole, especially since Turkey could potentially invoke Article 5 as the crisis continues to escalate. 

The Syrian crisis, as the longest-lasting phase of the Arab Awakening, is not only a Syrian issue, but it is also an issue for the broader Middle East since it is already causing instability throughout the region. Bordering Turkey, Iraq, Jordan, Israel and Lebanon, Syria’s sectarian conflict has already caused serious internal security difficulties in countries like Lebanon, Israel, Jordan and Iraq. It must not be forgotten that the regime in Damascus relies heavily on support from the Islamic Republic of Iran and its Hezbollah allies in Lebanon in order to stay in power and fend off the threat of state collapse.   In addition to the turmoil it has caused inside Syria, the Arab Awakening has led to some kind of closure within the Ba’ath party and was followed by a cessation of Syrian cooperation with Turkey. Now, the Turkish government strongly supports Syrian rebels organized in the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces  under the leadership of Moaz al-Khatib. The regional issue of Kurdish sovereignty is also prevalent, as the Kurdish population dominates large swaths of territory covering areas of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. Furthermore, many of the parties involved in the Syrian conflict fear a possible rise of Islamic extremism in the country. In such a case, Syria could become a long-term battlefield of various groups, including those allied with al-Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood. If that happens in the near future, neither Assad’s regime nor the rebels and their Western allies will feel secure in what will become an increasingly unpredictable environment. This uncertainty has led Israel to carefully monitor the civil war in Syria, as it anticipates a serious threat on its northern border from militant Islamist insurgents from Syria if these groups prevail in the conflict. At the moment, less extreme groups still hold power in the bloody Syrian war; as such, the conflict is primarily based on demands for political reforms, particularly for Sunni rule versus Alawi Shia rule (represented by the Assad family since 1970). 

Unfortunately, since the uprising began in March 2011, these ‘less extreme’ forces of regime and rebel troops have caused the deaths of more than 70,000 people within Syria, mostly civilians. At the same time, there are several hundred thousand refugees located mainly in camps in Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon. Additionally, an estimated four million people inside Syria are in need of humanitarian aid. 

Syria’s Threat to Turkey 

The Syrian conflict is extraordinarily complex and has major implications for regional security. As a consequence, Turkey’s security as a NATO member country is a critical issue. This obviously impacts NATO’s stance on Syria directly since Turkey has suffered numerous attacks against its border areas as part of the ongoing crisis. Moreover, since missiles coming from Syria have already caused deaths on Turkish soil, NATO’s decision in December 2012 to send Patriot missiles to the southern Turkish border has increased its stake in the ongoing crisis.  Between the end of 2012 and mid-February 2013, the United States, Germany, and the Netherlands deployed Patriot missiles to Turkey amid fears of a chemical weapons attack from Syria, a notion repudiated by Damascus. Regardless, if Islamist groups in Syria gain control of these weapons, Turkey and Israel will be seriously threatened.  Following these developments,NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said that there is a need for effective defense and protection for Turkey. The United States, Germany, and the Netherlands agreed to deploy two batteries of Patriot missiles each. Their main objective is to detect new launches of ’Scud-type missiles’ against rebel fighters. The United States approved the deployment of 400 troops to Incirlik Air Base, while Dutch and German troops number 300 each. The German, Dutch and Turkish defense ministers paid a joint visit to NATO Patriot batteries in Turkey on 23 February, showing the Alliance’s solidarity. The Syrian crisis marks the first time Patriot missiles have been located in Turkey since the 2003 campaign in Iraq. Officials in Damascus have denied the use of ballistic missiles in military activities. The Free Syrian Army (FSA) controls the northern parts of the country (the cities of Idlib and Hama and the area around the city of Aleppo), in addition to smaller areas in other parts of Syria. They are currently launching attacks on the capital of Damascus and Aleppo. Even though some analysts believe that Assad’s regime is in retreat from the north, these areas bordering Turkey remain extremely fragile and still could potentially provoke Ankara to act against Assad’s forces. Considering that it currently houses 150,000 Syrian refugees and has been susceptible to insurgent attacks from the south, it is not surprising that Turkey insists on concrete actions to secure the fragile 900 km border next to  Syria’s ‘bloody conflict’. In October 2012 Turkey shelled Syrian targets after a series of cross-border attacks. Turkey has claimed that the Syrian army and its martyrs might use chemical warheads against Turkish border communities, alarming its NATO allies. Therefore, the Turks demanded the installment of Patriot batteries in order to interrupt possible warhead attacks on Turkish soil. The Turks believe that Assad’s regime possesses Soviet-era Scuds and North Korean SS-21 missiles. Along with other observers, they also believe that the Syrian regime holds stocks of mustard gas, sarin nerve gas, and probably VX nerve agents. Officials in Ankara, aware of Iran’s importance in controlling Assad, have already organized a series of trilateral meetings with Iran and Egypt, Iran and Russia, and Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Many analysts believe that Russia’s role is vital for reaching a peaceful solution in the Syrian crisis, since Moscow has strong ties to the Assad regime. Turkey also moved 250 tanks to the Syrian border as an additional security measure, while at the same time the U.S. deployed 150 Special Forces in Jordan. 

Regional Implications 

The issue of Kurdish sovereignty remains important and relevant. The Kurdistan Worker’s Party’s (PKK) presence in Turkey and its tumultuous past must be included in the overall analysis, especially because it is a vital factor in understanding Turkish economic and security interests in the Middle East. Turkish companies like Genel Energy are very interested in exploiting natural gas reserves located in the Kurdish parts of Iraq. In August 2012 Genel Energy acquired interest in two oil blocks in Iraq: Bina Bawi and Miran. Genel Energy is the largest stakeholder in Bina Bawi, owning 44% of the shares, which leaves 20% to the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) and 36% to Austrian OMV. Turkey made a direct deal with the KRG without Baghdad’s official approval in May 2012, leading to the current deadlock between the KRG and the Baghdad government over Iraqi oil sales.  Genel Energy has interests in six oil production contracts with the KRG, specifically related to the Taq Taq, Ber Bahrm, Miran, Tawke, Dohuk, and Chia Surkh fields. They are planning a vast drilling campaign with the aim of developing a production sharing contract in the next 12 months. Large oil companies like Exxon Mobil, Chevron and Total also have interests in northern Iraq. At the same time, Genel Energy is reviewing its plans to deploy its oil export pipeline system in Kurdistan. The first pipeline in the northern Kirkuk field is already under construction, and any lack of security and stability in that area, which borders Syrian Kurdish lands, poses an obstacle for the free distribution of oil and gas toward Turkish and Western markets. Projects such as Nabucco with links to Iraq are very important for a diversified energy supply in Turkey and its NATO partner countries. One of the most important gas supplying initiatives is the Arab Gas Pipeline Project connecting Egypt’s El Arish with Turkish Kilis through Syrian territory. Ongoing conflict stopped that project with 230 km of pipeline left to complete from Homs in Syria to Turkey. Before the Arab Awakening Turkey had a very pragmatic approach, trying to build friendly relations with all of its neighbors. Now, it is very difficult to keep that kind of foreign policy balance given the regional upheaval. The decades-long strategy of ‘Zero Problems with Our Neighbors‘ must be reconsidered after new developments in the region. Turkey is heavily engaged in efforts to overthrow Syrian President Bashar al-Assad; at the same time, relations with Syria’s only regional ally, Iran, are declining. Finally, oil pipelines can cause problems in Turkish-Iraqi relations. Parts of the PKK are located in the northeastern areas of Syria, bordering Turkey and Iraq. The Syrian government forces with-drew from Kurdish majority areas last July. Since then, these areas are under Kurdish control near the oil pipeline routes. It is important for Turkey to prevent these groups from threatening Turkish interests. If Assad’s regime regains control over the Kurds in Syria and decides to block Turkish economic interests in that area, it could cause serious economic problems for Turkey and the wider EU-NATO area which are very dependent on the Middle East’s oil and gas supplies. The Turkish government is obviously cautious about the possible renewal of Syria’s links with the PKK, and as such is primarily concerned with diversifying its energy supplies which, for now, are mainly related to doing business with Iran. This energy issue could cause serious economic problems in Turkey since Turkey is one of the largest importers of Iranian crude oil, accounting for 7% of Iranian exports. After China, the European Union is the largest importer of Iranian crude oil. At the same time, NATO member states and the Iranian regime strongly disagree on the nature of the Iranian nuclear program, causing various obstacles to NATO initiatives in the region as well as promoting serious instability on a global level due to Iran’s flouting of international law.

Is NATO Ready To Intervene? 

One of the most important topics regarding current developments in the Syrian crisis is the issue of whether NATO or its member states are unilaterally ready and adequately equipped to militarily intervene in the ongoing conflict. Some security analysts believe that small stockpiles of precision guided munitions (PGMs) can serve as NATO’s crucial weapon in an air strike campaign, especially in densely populated areas. Since Syria has a substantial air defense network supported by Russia and Iran, any operation would likely require significantly more PGMs than the Libyan campaign in 2011. The NATO-led and UN Security Council-backed Libyan intervention, known as Operation Unified Protector, depleted energy and resources within NATO and its Gulf allies. Nineteen countries participated in the Operation, fourteen of whom were NATO member states. There are some estimates that many of the European member states involved in the Libyan campaign have relatively light reserves of PGMs. These missiles are quite expensive and there are only a few production lines of PGMs in the world. Many European NATO member states are reducing military expenditures in the equipment sector. Therefore, for most of them, a unilateral approach is not an option. A multilateral approach could provide sufficient PGM stockpiles for a possible intervention against Assad’s regime. However, a NATO military intervention in Syria is not a likely approach at the moment. NATO can consider several military options but it is very difficult to say whether these options can be implemented on the field in the near future. It is unlikely that the UN will allow any kind of military campaign against the Syrian government at the moment. Therefore, the only possible option is a unilateral intervention, probably led by the US and its NATO partners. In this case, NATO has three viable strategies:  declare no fly zones; prompt an air invasion without ground support or deploy a full scale military intervention including air power and ground troops. If NATO chooses to avoid direct intervention but still seeks to influence the outcome, it can choose to provide training and logistical support to the rebels. In that case, NATO must tactically consider to whom they deliver military assistance if they do not want to provoke wider and more violent conflict within Middle East. NATO’s need for restraint can be described in the Secretary General’s words:  ‘Syria is ethnically, politically, religiously much more complicated than Libya.’  Keeping postwar Libya in mind, NATO’s caution has strong justification. The ‘Afghanization’ scenario of Syria becoming deeply embroiled in sectarian war poses risks not only to Turkey but also to Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, Iraq, and the wider region. If it continues to develop into an unstoppable sectarian war without any chance for compromise between Assad and the rebels, Western democracies might be pressed to intervene in order to stop the humanitarian disaster. At this moment Russia and China are strongly opposed to any UN-mandated intervention against the Syrian Government. Moscow and Beijing have vetoed three UN Security Council resolutions aimed at isolating Assad’s regime, as they disagree with the view that the Syrian government is solely responsible for the current conflict. Even still, these developments within the UN are some kind of explanation and ‘excuse’ for why NATO has not organized some kind of military action against Assad’s troops. NATO states might be willing to deliver military assistance to the rebels, but there are justifiable fears that these weapons might end up in the hands of extremists who would cause further instability within Syria. For example, some groups like Hezbollah could potentially obtain advanced weaponry currently controlled by Assad’s troops, including chemical weapons. NATO must be careful in preventing other groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra from gaining possession of such weaponry. The newly created umbrella organization of the Syrian opposition, known as the National Coalition under the leadership of Sheikh Ahmed Moaz al-Khatib, is still insufficiently interconnected, posing another problem for Western states. 

The Free Syrian Army (FSA) led by Brigadier General Selim Idris is already under strong control of Islamist structures and NATO needs to be careful when engaging the numerous factions of rebels. There are some signals that the FSA has some ties with Salafists and the Muslim Brotherhood. At the same time, there are heavy sanctions against the Damascus regime, which was previously selling 98% of its oil to the EU states. Already, Syria has lost around $4 billion of revenue in terms of oil trade on the annual level. Even though there were signals after 2000 that Syria might build some friendly relations with Western democracies, chances of such a development are out of the question since the start of the conflict. Demands for Assad’s departure are very strong and there are no signals that the U.S. or EU are willing to cooperate with his regime. As of February 2013, U.S. policy is still focused on diplomatic and economic pressures as the main mechanisms for resolving the Syrian conflict. The US also supplies deliveries of humanitarian aid to the opposition forces. Some in the media speculate that certain Western intelligence services are involved in coordinating arms deliveries to the rebels in concert with Saudi Arabia and Qatar, but there are no signs that there is a systematic approach regarding this issue.

What  Can NATO Do To Stop The Syrian War?

It is obvious that there are several scenarios that could lead to the resolution of the Syrian civil war. Some of them, however, are unrealistic, such as reconciliation. The collapse of the regime could be a realistic outcome, but it depends on the cessation of Iranian and Russian support to Assad. The option of a negotiated exit appears to be an acceptable solution for rebels and Western states, but it seems that Assad does not consider this an option. As such, the conflict risks developing into a long civil war with elements of sectarian conflict. It could become ‘Multileveled Syrian Chaos’ consisting of smaller disputes on religious, ethnic, cultural, political, and economic levels within the bloody conflict. The most dangerous effect of such an outcome might be the rise of Islamist groups, which would cause great political instability within the region. Any spillover effect would drastically change the security of any neighboring country in addition to putting added strain on Turkey. In that case, conflict could spill over into not only Lebanon and Iraq, but also to Jordan and Israel. It could also be a source of daily unrest in Turkey. Few, if any, participants in the Syrian war are interested in the bloodiest scenario. Therefore, NATO must carefully consider all options, including the military campaign against insurgent elements, no matter if they belong to the official regime or to rebel factions in Syria. Any action will be very expensive in terms of human resources and equipment, but a passive approach could cost the global community much more. The U.S. and NATO-led ‘Friends of Syria Group’ must cooperate with the Assad regime’s protectors from Moscow and Tehran if they don’t want to create a new al-Qaeda headquarters in the heart of the Middle East. 

NATO, therefore, needs to reconsider its current approach to the Syrian conflict. It is not enough to focus solely on the humanitarian dimension; it is necessary to consider a diplomatic and military approach too. The Alliance must strengthen its dialogue with Damascus, Moscow, and if possible, Tehran. At the same time, if NATO decides to begin a military intervention, it needs to reconsider its strategy in dealing with rebel groups. Regardless of the chosen strategy, all require action not only on the part of NATO, but also Russia and China in order for diplomacy to be an active player in ending the ‘blood games’ in Syria.

Published in Atlantic Voices.

Volume 3 – Issue 3, March 2013

Brussels