The
Impact of Syria’s Conflict on
NATO’s
Security
by Branko Lazic
Two
years after the beginning of the Syrian revolu-tion and its transformation into
a civil war, there are no signs that officials in Damascus are going to reach
any kind of compromise with rebel leaders to end the violence. The negative
implications of the conflict for Middle Eastern and global security have the
potential to cause serious instability within the North Atlantic Community.
Turkey, a NATO member state, borders Syria to the north. Therefore, the Syrian
war poses a direct threat to NATO as a whole, especially since Turkey could
potentially invoke Article 5 as the crisis continues to escalate.
The
Syrian crisis, as the longest-lasting phase of the Arab Awakening, is not only
a Syrian issue, but it is also an issue for the broader Middle East since it is
already causing instability throughout the region. Bordering Turkey, Iraq,
Jordan, Israel and Lebanon, Syria’s sectarian conflict has already caused
serious internal security difficulties in countries like Lebanon, Israel,
Jordan and Iraq. It must not be forgotten that the regime in Damascus relies heavily
on support from the Islamic Republic of Iran and its Hezbollah allies in
Lebanon in order to stay in power and fend off the threat of state
collapse. In addition to the turmoil it
has caused inside Syria, the Arab Awakening has led to some kind of closure
within the Ba’ath party and was followed by a cessation of Syrian cooperation
with Turkey. Now, the Turkish government strongly supports Syrian rebels
organized in the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition
Forces under the leadership of Moaz
al-Khatib. The regional issue of Kurdish sovereignty is also prevalent, as the
Kurdish population dominates large swaths of territory covering areas of
Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. Furthermore, many of the parties involved in the
Syrian conflict fear a possible rise of Islamic extremism in the country. In
such a case, Syria could become a long-term battlefield of various groups,
including those allied with al-Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood. If that
happens in the near future, neither Assad’s regime nor the rebels and their
Western allies will feel secure in what will become an increasingly
unpredictable environment. This uncertainty has led Israel to carefully monitor
the civil war in Syria, as it anticipates a serious threat on its northern
border from militant Islamist insurgents from Syria if these groups prevail in
the conflict. At the moment, less extreme groups still hold power in the bloody
Syrian war; as such, the conflict is primarily based on demands for political
reforms, particularly for Sunni rule versus Alawi Shia rule (represented by the
Assad family since 1970).
Unfortunately,
since the uprising began in March 2011, these ‘less extreme’ forces of regime
and rebel troops have caused the deaths of more than 70,000 people within
Syria, mostly civilians. At the same time, there are several hundred thousand
refugees located mainly in camps in Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon. Additionally,
an estimated four million people inside Syria are in need of humanitarian aid.
Syria’s
Threat to Turkey
The
Syrian conflict is extraordinarily complex and has major implications for
regional security. As a consequence, Turkey’s security as a NATO member country
is a critical issue. This obviously impacts NATO’s stance on Syria directly
since Turkey has suffered numerous attacks against its border areas as part of
the ongoing crisis. Moreover, since missiles coming from Syria have already
caused deaths on Turkish soil, NATO’s decision in December 2012 to send Patriot
missiles to the southern Turkish border has increased its stake in the ongoing
crisis. Between the end of 2012 and
mid-February 2013, the United States, Germany, and the Netherlands deployed
Patriot missiles to Turkey amid fears of a chemical weapons attack from Syria,
a notion repudiated by Damascus. Regardless, if Islamist groups in Syria gain
control of these weapons, Turkey and Israel will be seriously threatened. Following these developments,NATO
Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said that there is a need for effective
defense and protection for Turkey. The United States, Germany, and the
Netherlands agreed to deploy two batteries of Patriot missiles each. Their main
objective is to detect new launches of ’Scud-type missiles’ against rebel
fighters. The United States approved the deployment of 400 troops to Incirlik
Air Base, while Dutch and German troops number 300 each. The German, Dutch and
Turkish defense ministers paid a joint visit to NATO Patriot batteries in
Turkey on 23 February, showing the Alliance’s solidarity. The Syrian crisis
marks the first time Patriot missiles have been located in Turkey since the
2003 campaign in Iraq. Officials in Damascus have denied the use of ballistic
missiles in military activities. The Free Syrian Army (FSA) controls the
northern parts of the country (the cities of Idlib and Hama and the area around
the city of Aleppo), in addition to smaller areas in other parts of Syria. They
are currently launching attacks on the capital of Damascus and Aleppo. Even
though some analysts believe that Assad’s regime is in retreat from the north,
these areas bordering Turkey remain extremely fragile and still could
potentially provoke Ankara to act against Assad’s forces. Considering that it
currently houses 150,000 Syrian refugees and has been susceptible to insurgent
attacks from the south, it is not surprising that Turkey insists on concrete
actions to secure the fragile 900 km border next to Syria’s ‘bloody conflict’. In October 2012
Turkey shelled Syrian targets after a series of cross-border attacks. Turkey
has claimed that the Syrian army and its martyrs might use chemical warheads
against Turkish border communities, alarming its NATO allies. Therefore, the
Turks demanded the installment of Patriot batteries in order to interrupt
possible warhead attacks on Turkish soil. The Turks believe that Assad’s regime
possesses Soviet-era Scuds and North Korean SS-21 missiles. Along with other
observers, they also believe that the Syrian regime holds stocks of mustard
gas, sarin nerve gas, and probably VX nerve agents. Officials in Ankara, aware
of Iran’s importance in controlling Assad, have already organized a series of
trilateral meetings with Iran and Egypt, Iran and Russia, and Egypt and Saudi
Arabia. Many analysts believe that Russia’s role is vital for reaching a
peaceful solution in the Syrian crisis, since Moscow has strong ties to the
Assad regime. Turkey also moved 250 tanks to the Syrian border as an additional
security measure, while at the same time the U.S. deployed 150 Special Forces
in Jordan.
Regional
Implications
The
issue of Kurdish sovereignty remains important and relevant. The Kurdistan
Worker’s Party’s (PKK) presence in Turkey and its tumultuous past must be
included in the overall analysis, especially because it is a vital factor in understanding
Turkish economic and security interests in the Middle East. Turkish companies
like Genel Energy are very interested in exploiting natural gas reserves
located in the Kurdish parts of Iraq. In August 2012 Genel Energy acquired
interest in two oil blocks in Iraq: Bina Bawi and Miran. Genel Energy is the
largest stakeholder in Bina Bawi, owning 44% of the shares, which leaves 20% to
the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) and 36% to Austrian OMV. Turkey made a
direct deal with the KRG without Baghdad’s official approval in May 2012,
leading to the current deadlock between the KRG and the Baghdad government over
Iraqi oil sales. Genel Energy has
interests in six oil production contracts with the KRG, specifically related to
the Taq Taq, Ber Bahrm, Miran, Tawke, Dohuk, and Chia Surkh fields. They are
planning a vast drilling campaign with the aim of developing a production
sharing contract in the next 12 months. Large oil companies like Exxon Mobil,
Chevron and Total also have interests in northern Iraq. At the same time, Genel
Energy is reviewing its plans to deploy its oil export pipeline system in
Kurdistan. The first pipeline in the northern Kirkuk field is already under
construction, and any lack of security and stability in that area, which borders
Syrian Kurdish lands, poses an obstacle for the free distribution of oil and
gas toward Turkish and Western markets. Projects such as Nabucco with links to
Iraq are very important for a diversified energy supply in Turkey and its NATO
partner countries. One of the most important gas supplying initiatives is the
Arab Gas Pipeline Project connecting Egypt’s El Arish with Turkish Kilis
through Syrian territory. Ongoing conflict stopped that project with 230 km of
pipeline left to complete from Homs in Syria to Turkey. Before the Arab
Awakening Turkey had a very pragmatic approach, trying to build friendly
relations with all of its neighbors. Now, it is very difficult to keep that
kind of foreign policy balance given the regional upheaval. The decades-long strategy
of ‘Zero Problems with Our Neighbors‘ must be reconsidered after new
developments in the region. Turkey is heavily engaged in efforts to overthrow
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad; at the same time, relations with Syria’s only
regional ally, Iran, are declining. Finally, oil pipelines can cause problems
in Turkish-Iraqi relations. Parts of the PKK are located in the northeastern
areas of Syria, bordering Turkey and Iraq. The Syrian government forces
with-drew from Kurdish majority areas last July. Since then, these areas are
under Kurdish control near the oil pipeline routes. It is important for Turkey
to prevent these groups from threatening Turkish interests. If Assad’s regime
regains control over the Kurds in Syria and decides to block Turkish economic
interests in that area, it could cause serious economic problems for Turkey and
the wider EU-NATO area which are very dependent on the Middle East’s oil and
gas supplies. The Turkish government is obviously cautious about the possible
renewal of Syria’s links with the PKK, and as such is primarily concerned with
diversifying its energy supplies which, for now, are mainly related to doing
business with Iran. This energy issue could cause serious economic problems in
Turkey since Turkey is one of the largest importers of Iranian crude oil,
accounting for 7% of Iranian exports. After China, the European Union is the
largest importer of Iranian crude oil. At the same time, NATO member states and
the Iranian regime strongly disagree on the nature of the Iranian nuclear
program, causing various obstacles to NATO initiatives in the region as well as
promoting serious instability on a global level due to Iran’s flouting of
international law.
Is
NATO Ready To Intervene?
One
of the most important topics regarding current developments in the Syrian
crisis is the issue of whether NATO or its member states are unilaterally ready
and adequately equipped to militarily intervene in the ongoing conflict. Some
security analysts believe that small stockpiles of precision guided munitions
(PGMs) can serve as NATO’s crucial weapon in an air strike campaign, especially
in densely populated areas. Since Syria has a substantial air defense network supported
by Russia and Iran, any operation would likely require significantly more PGMs
than the Libyan campaign in 2011. The NATO-led and UN Security Council-backed
Libyan intervention, known as Operation Unified Protector, depleted energy and
resources within NATO and its Gulf allies. Nineteen countries participated in
the Operation, fourteen of whom were NATO member states. There are some
estimates that many of the European member states involved in the Libyan
campaign have relatively light reserves of PGMs. These missiles are quite
expensive and there are only a few production lines of PGMs in the world. Many
European NATO member states are reducing military expenditures in the equipment
sector. Therefore, for most of them, a unilateral approach is not an option. A
multilateral approach could provide sufficient PGM stockpiles for a possible
intervention against Assad’s regime. However, a NATO military intervention in
Syria is not a likely approach at the moment. NATO can consider several
military options but it is very difficult to say whether these options can be
implemented on the field in the near future. It is unlikely that the UN will allow
any kind of military campaign against the Syrian government at the moment.
Therefore, the only possible option is a unilateral intervention, probably led
by the US and its NATO partners. In this case, NATO has three viable strategies: declare no fly zones; prompt an air invasion without
ground support or deploy a full scale military intervention including air power
and ground troops. If NATO chooses to avoid direct intervention but still seeks
to influence the outcome, it can choose to provide training and logistical
support to the rebels. In that case, NATO must tactically consider to whom they
deliver military assistance if they do not want to provoke wider and more
violent conflict within Middle East. NATO’s need for restraint can be described
in the Secretary General’s words: ‘Syria
is ethnically, politically, religiously much more complicated than Libya.’ Keeping postwar Libya in mind, NATO’s caution
has strong justification. The ‘Afghanization’ scenario of Syria becoming deeply
embroiled in sectarian war poses risks not only to Turkey but also to Lebanon,
Israel, Jordan, Iraq, and the wider region. If it continues to develop into an
unstoppable sectarian war without any chance for compromise between Assad and
the rebels, Western democracies might be pressed to intervene in order to stop
the humanitarian disaster. At this moment Russia and China are strongly opposed
to any UN-mandated intervention against the Syrian Government. Moscow and Beijing
have vetoed three UN Security Council resolutions aimed at isolating Assad’s
regime, as they disagree with the view that the Syrian government is solely
responsible for the current conflict. Even still, these developments within the
UN are some kind of explanation and ‘excuse’ for why NATO has not organized some
kind of military action against Assad’s troops. NATO states might be willing to
deliver military assistance to the rebels, but there are justifiable fears that
these weapons might end up in the hands of extremists who would cause further instability
within Syria. For example, some groups like Hezbollah could potentially obtain
advanced weaponry currently controlled by Assad’s troops, including chemical
weapons. NATO must be careful in preventing other groups such as Jabhat
al-Nusra from gaining possession of such weaponry. The newly created umbrella
organization of the Syrian opposition, known as the National Coalition under
the leadership of Sheikh Ahmed Moaz al-Khatib, is still insufficiently
interconnected, posing another problem for Western states.
The
Free Syrian Army (FSA) led by Brigadier General Selim Idris is already under strong
control of Islamist structures and NATO needs to be careful when engaging the numerous
factions of rebels. There are some signals that the FSA has some ties with
Salafists and the Muslim Brotherhood. At the same time, there are heavy
sanctions against the Damascus regime, which was previously selling 98% of its
oil to the EU states. Already, Syria has lost around $4 billion of revenue in
terms of oil trade on the annual level. Even though there were signals after
2000 that Syria might build some friendly relations with Western democracies, chances
of such a development are out of the question since the start of the conflict.
Demands for Assad’s departure are very strong and there are no signals that the
U.S. or EU are willing to cooperate with his regime. As of February 2013, U.S.
policy is still focused on diplomatic and economic pressures as the main mechanisms
for resolving the Syrian conflict. The US also supplies deliveries of humanitarian
aid to the opposition forces. Some in the media speculate that certain Western
intelligence services are involved in coordinating arms deliveries to the
rebels in concert with Saudi Arabia and Qatar, but there are no signs that
there is a systematic approach regarding this issue.
What
Can NATO Do To Stop The Syrian War?
It
is obvious that there are several scenarios that could lead to the resolution
of the Syrian civil war. Some of them, however, are unrealistic, such as
reconciliation. The collapse of the regime could be a realistic outcome, but it
depends on the cessation of Iranian and Russian support to Assad. The option of
a negotiated exit appears to be an acceptable solution for rebels and Western
states, but it seems that Assad does not consider this an option. As such, the
conflict risks developing into a long civil war with elements of sectarian
conflict. It could become ‘Multileveled Syrian Chaos’ consisting of smaller
disputes on religious, ethnic, cultural, political, and economic levels within
the bloody conflict. The most dangerous effect of such an outcome might be the
rise of Islamist groups, which would cause great political instability within
the region. Any spillover effect would drastically change the security of any
neighboring country in addition to putting added strain on Turkey. In that case,
conflict could spill over into not only Lebanon and Iraq, but also to Jordan
and Israel. It could also be a source of daily unrest in Turkey. Few, if any,
participants in the Syrian war are interested in the bloodiest scenario.
Therefore, NATO must carefully consider all options, including the military campaign
against insurgent elements, no matter if they belong to the official regime or
to rebel factions in Syria. Any action will be very expensive in terms of human
resources and equipment, but a passive approach could cost the global community
much more. The U.S. and NATO-led ‘Friends of Syria Group’ must cooperate with
the Assad regime’s protectors from Moscow and Tehran if they don’t want to
create a new al-Qaeda headquarters in the heart of the Middle East.
NATO,
therefore, needs to reconsider its current approach to the Syrian conflict. It
is not enough to focus solely on the humanitarian dimension; it is necessary to
consider a diplomatic and military approach too. The Alliance must strengthen
its dialogue with Damascus, Moscow, and if possible, Tehran. At the same time,
if NATO decides to begin a military intervention, it needs to reconsider its
strategy in dealing with rebel groups. Regardless of the chosen strategy, all
require action not only on the part of NATO, but also Russia and China in order
for diplomacy to be an active player in ending the ‘blood games’ in Syria.
Published in Atlantic Voices.
Volume 3 – Issue 3, March 2013
Brussels